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1.  Introduction 
 
Estimating precisely the aggregate elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled 
workers is an extremely important task. Development and growth economists need the long run 
estimate of such elasticity to assess the effect of an increase in schooling on average income (see, 
for instance, Hendricks 2002). Labor economists need such elasticity to measure the impact of 
increasing supply of highly skilled workers on the average returns to education. Analysts of 
technological progress need such elasticity to identify the effect of skill-biased technological 
progress on relative wages (see, for instance, Autor and Katz 1999, Katz and Murphy 1992). The 
main contribution of this paper is to produce more accurate and methodologically improved 
estimates of the aggregate long run elasticity of substitution between low skilled and high skilled 
workers. We then use these estimates to identify skill biased technological growth and Hicks neutral 
technological growth for U.S. states in the period 1950-1990.  
Estimating properly the substitutability between low skilled and high skilled workers is made 
particularly urgent by the fact that the assumptions often used to combine aggregate factors into an 
aggregate production function (Linear or Cobb-Douglas) do not seem to work well in this case. On 
the one hand low skilled and high skilled workers do not appear to be perfect substitutes (their 
relative wage changes when the relative supply changes) and their supplies cannot simply be 
“added”. On the other hand they seem easier to substitute for each other than a Cobb-Douglas 
combination (elasticity of substitution equal to one) would imply.  It is not surprising, therefore, 
that aggregate data on supply and compensation of workers at the sector and state-level have been 
used since the seventies to produce estimates of this elasticity. Bowles (1970), Dougherty (1972), 
Fallon and Layard (1975) and more recently Katz and Murphy (1992) have all addressed this issue. 
The formidable difficulty of this task, however, is easy to explain. To identify the aggregate long-
run elasticity of substitution between high and low skills we should observe the response of relative 
compensation of high and low skills to a change in their relative supply as other factors are being 
kept constant. In econometric terms we need an exogenous random variation of the aggregate 
supply of skills.  Researchers, however, have soon realized that two important factors tend to vary 
systematically with the relative supply of skills across countries and over time inducing spurious 
correlations: physical capital and technology. Skill-biased technological progress (as in Acemoglu 
1998, Acemoglu and Zilibotti 2001) or skill-complementary machine investments (as in Fallon and 
Layard 1975 or Krusell et al. 2000) affect the return to skills and also induce higher supply of them, 
as people respond to increased returns by getting higher education. Consider, for instance, open   3
economies such as the U.S. states: it is very likely that the differentials in returns to skills would 
induce migration of skilled workers to states that pay large skill premia. Alternatively, people living 
in states with highly paid skills may decide to remain in school longer and accumulate more skills 
increasing their supply. This would induce a positive (reverse) link between skill supply and return 
to skills and would bias (towards zero) the estimate of the elasticity of substitution between skills in 
a regression of relative wages on relative skills.  The bottom line is that it is very hard to identify an 
exogenous random variation in the aggregate supply of skills. 
Other authors have relied on microeconomic estimates of the elasticity of substitution (Johnson 
1997), or on restrictions and structural specifications (Krusell et al 2000, Caselli and Coleman 
2002a, 2002b) or on simple assumptions such as the constancy over time of skill-bias technological 
change (Katz and Murphy 1992).  Our contribution is to tackle the endogeneity problem in the 
classic way, using instrumental variables estimation. Given the centrality of this parameter we 
devote two sections of the paper (4 and 5) to discuss the validity of the instruments and to convince 
the reader of the robustness of our estimates. The labor literature has suggested and used excellent 
instruments for the supply of skills which, where available, could be used at the aggregate level as 
well. Child labor laws and compulsory schooling laws had an important impact in affecting the 
level of schooling across U.S. states, especially during the forties and fifties. In particular, as they 
mandated a certain number of years of schooling, they affected significantly the high school 
graduation rates of several cohorts of people. Moreover as their adoption was mainly driven by 
“philanthropic” and “ideal” motivations among legislators these laws were quite exogenous to the 
process of technological change and capital accumulation. The laws were state-specific and 
changed over the years so that they provide the needed exogenous variation over-time and across-
states affecting the relative supply of skills. Acemoglu and Angrist (2000) collected information on 
these laws and first used them as instruments for schooling at the individual level. They argue 
convincingly in their work that these laws affected the marginal decision of people to graduate from 
high school and they were not endogenously affected by returns to skills. Our identifying 
assumption is similar to theirs, except that we only need schooling laws to be independent of the 
bias of technological change, a condition weaker that the independence from returns to schooling 
assumed by Acemoglu and Angrist (2000). We use their data on these laws at the aggregate state 
level as instruments for the skill distribution of workers at the state level. While reasonably 
exogenous the child-labor and compulsory-schooling laws turn out to be rather weak instruments. 
This is not a surprise as the laws affect weakly the rate of graduation from high school and we use 
them to instrument the whole relative supply of skills. Aware of such weakness we check the 
robustness of our estimates using methods more robust to weak instrument bias than 2SLS, such as   4
LIML and Fuller LIML. We also add to the set of instruments the share of children below fifteen 
years of age in the state. This variable is strongly correlated with the relative supply of skills as 
younger workers in the period 1950-1990 entered the labor market with higher education than older 
workers. Moreover such variable is still likely to be exogenous to the technological adoption 
process. Using this method we estimate the elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled 
workers to be around 1.55, possibly as large as 1.96. Such estimates are quite precise and they rely 
on instruments that seem more exogenous than any other variable available for cross-country 
studies. We show that they correct for a significant OLS bias towards zero.  The obtained estimates 
are not far from the other existing estimates from micro literature or from aggregate estimation so 
that, while our points are important methodologically, they do not produce drastically different 
estimates and confirm confidence in the existing estimates.  
Using the estimated elasticity of substitution we can then measure the skill biased 
technological progress (SBTP) and the Hicks neutral technological progress (HNTP) across US 
states for each decade between 1950 and 1990.  In particular we present a model, similar to Katz 
and Murphy (1992), in which the elasticity of substitution between high and low skills is the pivotal 
parameter in order to obtain, using accounting techniques, estimates of HNTP and SBTP. These two 
components of technological progress have been mostly studied separately up to these days
2. 
Growth economists (since the seminal work of Solow, 1957, 1958) have focused on HNTP in the 
form of “the Solow Residual” attributing to it at least half of the growth in productivity in the last 
several decades
3 (see Jones 2002, Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare 1997 among others). Labor 
economists have focused on SBTP in the analysis of the increase in the “skill premium” among 
U.S. in the eighties and nineties (see Berman et al. 1994, Bound and Johsnon 1992, Katz and 
Murphy 1992, Murphy and Welsh 1992). A form of technological progress that enhances the 
productivity of skilled workers relative to the productivity of the unskilled ones could be an 
important component , while not the only one, to explain such phenomenon (see Card and DiNardo 
2002 for an excellent discussion of the issue).  
An interesting fact emerges from our joint estimates of these two types of technological 
progress across U.S. states.  A strong and significant negative correlation between Hicks-Neutral 
and skill biased progress existed across states since the fifties and strengthened in the eighties. 
States with higher skill biased technological growth had lower Hicks neutral technological growth 
and such trade off became stronger and tighter during the eighties. This is consistent with the idea 
of a “technological frontier”, namely a “menu” of technological development options among which 
                                                            
2 Recently the work of Caselli and Coleman (2000a) has looked at these two components of technological progress 
together.  
3 The remaining growth in labor productivity was due to physical and human capital accumulation.   5
the representative firm in each state could choose. Different choices across states would generate 
the combinations of SBTP and HNTP that we estimate.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the related literature. 
Section 3 presents the empirical specification and derives the equations used to calculate SBTP and 
HNTP. Section 4 discusses the data and the instruments and section 5 presents and discusses the 
estimates of the elasticity of substitution between skills. Section 6 analyzes the estimated SBTP and 
HNTP and documents the trade-off between them on a technological frontier for U.S. states. 
Section 7 concludes the paper.  
 
 
2. Related Literature  
 
The analysis of the elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled workers has gone 
hand in hand with the analysis of skill-biased technological change. Already in the seventies Fallon 
and Layard (1975) were puzzled by the fact that the secular increase in the supply of skilled 
workers in the fifties and sixties did not decrease the skill premium measured by relative wages. 
They explored the possibility of a skill-biased form of progress working through capital-skill 
complementarities. Griliches (1969), Bowles (1970) and Dougherty (1972) proposed models with 
an aggregate production function and constant elasticity of substitution (CES) between workers 
with different skills, to analyze substitutability of skills and shifts in productivity of different 
factors.  
During the nineties the phenomenon of increased wage dispersion (in particular of increased 
skill premium, measured as relative wage of college vs. high school graduates) revived the interest 
and the need for a good estimate of the aggregate substitutability of skills. An influential article by 
Katz and Murphy (1992) still provides a much quoted reference able to explain changes in skill 
premia in the seventies and eighties using demand and supply of skills and a constant skill biased 
technological change over time. Our work builds on a similar frame as Katz and Murphy (1992) but 
improves on the identification and estimation of the elasticity of substitution between skills, 
addressing explicitly the issue of long-run substitution and endogeneity of skills. We also show that 
the CES framework, with constant elasticity of substitution between skills and time-varying 
technological progress is a good representation of aggregate production for US states.  Moreover 
our model, by nesting the Katz and Murphy (1992) frame into a growth-accounting analysis, allows 
to measure sequentially skill-biased and Hicks neutral technological progress and to analyze 
whether there is a systematic relation between the two.    6
The increase in skill premium of the eighties was followed in the U.S. by a surge of productivity 
since 1995 and this attracted the interest of several growth and labor economists.  The information 
and communication technology (ICT) revolution was regarded as the new general purpose 
technology, which could potentially be the source of the early skill-biased progress (eighties) and of 
the later productivity surge of the nineties (for instance Gordon 2000, Jorgenson and Stiroh 2000, 
Oliner and Sichel 2000). The literature on increasing skill premium and on the productivity surge 
became interactive and recently some papers have framed this issue into what used to be called  
“theory of appropriate technology” (Atkison and Stiglitz 1969). Basu and Weil (1998) and Caselli 
and Coleman (2002a) explicitly model the choice of a country which is adopting a technology out 
of a menu of available ones.  They stress that this is possible if there is a “menu” or a “frontier” of 
possible technological choices, some more intensive in skill-biased growth, other in Hicks-neutral 
growth. Caselli and Coleman (2002a) estimate such frontier for a large set of countries. Similarly 
Acemoglu (1998) and Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001) model the direction of technological change 
as depending on the relative supply of skills in trying to explain the behavior of skill premium in the 
seventies and eighties. The present paper explores, for the first time at the U.S. State-level (1950-
1990), the empirical task of measuring SBTP and HNTP. We can calculate the trade off between 
these two forms of progress on the technological frontier, and we can track how this trade off 
changed over the decades 1950-1990. 
 
3. The Model 
 
  3.1 The Production Function 
A homogeneous, perfectly tradable good  ct Y  is produced in state c at time t according to 
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The function is a Cobb-Douglas combination of physical capital Kct and of a CES composite 
factor of unskilled labor  ct L  and skilled labor  ct H . We allow for different shares of income to 
physical capital across states (αc) but we assume that they do not change over time. In Section 6 we 
show that this has, in fact, been the case for U.S. states supporting our choice of a Cobb-Douglas 
aggregation of labor and physical capital. The elasticity of substitution between skilled and 
unskilled workers (1/1-σ), on the other hand, is assumed to be equal across states and over time for   7
the whole period
4.  This specification is similar to the one used by Katz and Murphy (1992) or by 
Krusell et al (2000) without equipment capital
5. The elasticity of substitution between capital and 
the composite labor factor is imposed to be equal to 1. This assumption simplifies the treatment of 
our model as we plan to focus on skill-biased (rather than capital-biased) technological progress. 
Caselli and Coleman (2002b) show that for the aggregate United States similar results on the 
efficiency of skilled and unskilled factors are obtained with this specification or with a nested CES 
that allows complementarity between skilled workers and physical capital. The elasticity of 
substitution between   ct L  and  ct H is 
σ − 1
1
with σ<1.  ct Λ  is the skilled-labor effectiveness, relative 
to unskilled labor. We call it skill biased technological level. Its rate of change over time 
) ln( ) ln( 1 − Λ − Λ ct ct  captures the bias of technological progress towards skilled labor and we call it 
skilled biased technological progress (SBTP).   ct Ω  is a measure of Hicks neutral productivity. 
Given our specification it is not possible to distinguish whether it captures capital or unskilled labor 
efficiency. We call it Hicks Neutral technological level. Its rate of change over time 
[) ln( ) ln( 1 − Ω − Ω ct ct ] captures the Hicks-neutral technological progress (HNTP). The above 
functional form for the production function is particularly appropriate for our purposes. First of all it 
allows the analysis of substitutability between high and low skills which would have been 
impossible in a fully Cobb-Douglas specification. Second it maintains an easy structure in the 
substitution between physical capital and labor inputs as a whole and matches the fact that capital 
share in income has been rather stable over time for each U.S. state. Finally it allows the joint 
analysis of technological progress that has neutral effect on productivity, and of technological 
progress that increases relative productivity of highly skilled workers. These two types of progress, 
as discussed above, have been under the scrutiny of the growth, labor and productivity literature and 
mostly analyzed and debated in the last decade. While most of the analysis has been concentrated 
on analyzing them across countries or over time we believe that it is interesting to look at different 
U.S. states over time as this sample probably provides the cleanest example of different 
technological combinations out of a common menu of opportunities.  
Our goal is to use the observed wages, and the observed quantities and prices of factors, 
particularly of skilled and unskilled workers, to estimate the unobservable Hicks-neutral 
technological level and the skill-biased technological level. To do this we first need to estimate the 
parameter σ.  Our key empirical constructs are obtained by simply manipulating the equalities 
between marginal productivity and return of factors reported below: 
                                                            
4 We also check in Section 5.2 the stability of this elasticity across decades. 
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In conditions (2)-(4) we expressed the variables in “per worker” terms. Nct is the total number of 
workers in state c period t, given by the sum of skilled Hct and unskilled Lct. (Kct/Nct) is physical 
capital per worker and lct and hct are, respectively, the share of unskilled workers (Lct/Nct) and the 
share of skilled workers (Hct/Nct) in state c at time t.  Equation (2) states that marginal productivity 
of physical capital in each state at time t is equal to the common real rental cost of capital Rt at time 
t
6. Equation (3) states that marginal productivity of unskilled workers is equal to their wage w
L
ct 







3.2 Identifying the Skill Biased and the Hicks Neutral Technological Levels 
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Equation (5) shows that we can calculate the skill biased technological Level using the 
relative wages of skilled and unskilled workers and their shares in total employment as long as we 
know the elasticity of substitution 1/(1-σ). We postpone the discussion of identification and 
estimation of σ to the next section. Proceeding to the identification of the Hicks neutral 
technological level, we can derive the expression for (Kct/Nct) from equation (2) and substitute it (3) 
                                                            
6 The real rental cost of capital is equal to the real interest rate plus the depreciation rate of capital: Rt=(rt+δ).   9
and (4). We combine expression (3) and (4) using the fact that average wage (wct) for state c at time 
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Finally solving Ωct out of equation (6) we obtain the following expression for the Hicks 
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Expression (7) can be used to calculate the Hicks neutral technological level, once we have 
the (previously calculated) parameters Λct, σ, and given the data on average wages, on the real 
rental cost of capital, on the share of income going to capital and on the supply of skilled and 








ct ct ct ct ct h l w w  the “adjusted average wage”.  The “adjustment factor” in the 
denominator depends on the elasticity of substitution between skills and on their shares in total 
employment. In the case of perfect substitutability between skilled and unskilled workers (σ=1 and 
Λct =1) the adjustment factor is one and we are back in the standard Cobb-Douglas case. Using this 
definition, expression (7) is the usual relationship that defines Hicks neutral Technological Progress 
in the “dual” version
7 of growth accounting. In particular, taking expression (7) in the “log-
difference” form that is more commonly used, we have: 
 
) ~ ln( ) 1 ( ln ln ct c t c ct w R ∆ − + ∆ = Ω ∆ α α      (8) 
 
                                                            
7 The “Dual” version of growth accounting uses shares and prices of factors (rather than quantities) to infer total factor 
productivity. See for instance Hsieh (2002).   10
The HNTP on the left side (called Solow-residual in the standard Cobb-Douglas case) is 
equal to the growth rate of the rental rate of capital, Rt, times the share of capital αc plus the growth 
rate of “adjusted average wage”,  ct w ~ ,  times the share of labor (1- αc).  
Our empirical procedure consists simply in implementing empirically the steps described 
here. Once we have a good estimate of σ we use (5) to calculate Λct for the 48 US continental states 
(excluding Alaska and Hawaii), considering the 10-year data between 1950 and 1990. The HBTP is 





  3.3 Identifying the Elasticity of Substitution between Skilled and Unskilled 
 
The procedure that we described above has, at its very foundation, the use of a good 
measure of the parameter σ that determines the elasticity of substitution between skilled and 
unskilled workers. We focus on estimating robustly and consistently such parameter for the long 
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Equation (9) shows that, were other terms constant, in particular were  ct Λ  constant in each 
state and over time, the percentage difference in relative factor price associated to one percentage 
difference in relative factor supply, would provide a measure of the inverse of the direct elasticity of 





ct) on ln(Lct/ Hct) would consistently estimate the value of  (1-σ) as 
coefficient on the dependent variable. Alternatively, if  ct Λ were to change in each state and over 
time, but such changes were not correlated with the change of relative factor supplies in the state, 
we could still estimate consistently (1-σ). An OLS regression of the change in log of relative wages 
on the change in log of relative factor supplies, pooling states together, would deliver consistent 
estimates as coefficient of the dependent variable. Unluckily, neither of the above assumptions is 
plausible. Certainly  ct Λ differ over time and across US states as they depend on their initial   11
technology and on the structure of production of each state. Moreover, as skilled workers move 
across states, it is plausible to think that they respond to skill-biased technology so that the relative 
supply of factors in a state is correlated with its skill biased technological level. Our hope to 
estimate (1-σ) consistently is to perform an IV estimation using instruments that are correlated with 
the change in relative supply of skills for each state but are orthogonal to the state-specific skilled 
biased technological change. We believe that the schooling and child-labor laws gathered by the 
Acemoglu and Angrist (2000)   and discussed in detail later, serve this purpose and are, to this days, 
the best instrument available for individual and state schooling levels. 
 
4. The Data and the Instruments 
 
4.1 Factor Supplies 
As our model adopts the simplifying assumption that only two skill levels exist and they 
exhibit imperfect substitutability with each other, we need to map several levels of schooling into 
these two groups. We use individual data from the U.S. Census Public Use Microdata Sample to 
construct skill’s supply and wages. We consider only U.S. born white males aged 22-58. This is 
done in order to eliminate any problem of gender and ethnic composition. The data are described in 
detail in the Appendix A. The data identify the highest degree attended for each person in the 
sample and we report in Table 1 the average share of each schooling group in the total US working 
population per census year. The four schooling groups identified by the data (High School 
Dropouts, High School Graduates, College Dropouts and College graduates) are then mapped into 
two skill groups. A simple way of doing this, similarly to what Katz and Murphy (1992) and 
Johnson (1997) do, is to assume that workers can be grouped into two categories of skills. Those 
without a degree (i.e. high school dropouts) did not learn sophisticated skills and are therefore type 
L, they are pure “low skills equivalents”. Those who graduated from high school acquired skills 
becoming type H. Continued education after High School allows workers to accumulate more skills 
so that they increase their supply of “high skills equivalents” within the category H. Skilled workers 
(with at least a high school degree) are all perfect substitutes: receiving higher education is 
equivalent to increasing one’s quantity of skills. Skilled and unskilled workers, on the other hand, 
are different factors of production. Within the group of perfectly substitutable skilled workers H we 
choose one level of schooling as the base-group. As described below in greater detail, we try with 
two different base groups.  The supply of other groups is converted into “base-group” equivalents 
using their relative wages that captures their relative content of skills, as within groups workers are 
perfectly substitutable.    12
 
 
Table 1:  







Share of HS 
Graduates 
(average US) 
Share of College 
Dropouts  
(average US) 
Share of College 
Graduates 
(average US) 
1950  0.60  0.22 0.10 0.08 
1960  0.50  0.28 0.11 0.11 
1970  0.35  0.35 0.15 0.15 
1980  0.22  0.37 0.20 0.21 
1990  0.12  0.33 0.30 0.25 
Source: Author’s Calculations on U.S. Census Public Use Microdata Samples 1950,60,70,80,90. 
 
 
Imposing the cut-off between skilled and unskilled at the high-school level (rather than 
higher) is a choice motivated by three reasons. First our instruments, the compulsory attendance and 
child labor laws, are mainly affecting the margin of high-school graduation and by choosing high 
school dropouts as unskilled and high school graduates (and more) as skilled we maximize the 
correlation of the instruments with the relative skill supply. Second this type of categorization is 
very much in line with what done in the cross-country literature. Graduation from secondary school 
is the measure of human capital in several cross-countries studies (see Mankiw Romer and Weil 
1992 and Bils and Klenow 1998 among others) and when two skill groups are explicitly considered 
they are usually secondary school graduates versus workers without secondary education (as in 
Caselli and Coleman 2002a or Hendricks 2002). Third, graduation from high school is probably the 
most important “fact” concerning education attainments of the labor force during the 1950-1990 
period. The recent literature on skill premium in the US has used High School Graduates versus 
College Graduates as reference groups. However this has been probably the consequence of 
focusing on the 80’s as the relevant decade. Table 1 shows that considering the period 1950-1990 a 
most relevant cause of increase in skills supply among workers is the increase in the share of high 
school graduates. The table shows that the single most dramatic change across educational groups 
for the period 1950-1990 is certainly the dramatic decrease of workers without a high school 
degree. That group decreased from a majority of the workers (60%) in 1950 to a small minority 
(12%) in 1990. The increase of college graduates, while large, is by no means as remarkable: that 
group increased from 8% of the working population in 1950 to 25% in 1990.  Also considering 
High School Dropouts as unskilled and the rest of the groups as skilled workers we have a nice 
monotonic behavior over all decades of their supplies, with the first group decreasing its share in 
the labor force and the second increasing it. To the contrary, considering High School graduates and   13
College graduates as the two groups we have that both groups increased their shares up to 1980 and 




The evolution of relative and average real wages in the US 
Year: Wco/Whs W co/Whsd Average  W 
(1950=1) 
1950 1.20  1.34  1.00 
1960 1.36  1.69  1.41 
1970 1.45  1.95  2.22 
1980 1.45  1.98  2.02 
1990 1.76  2.55  2.53 
Tot change in %  +46%  +90%  +153% 
Source: Author’s Calculations on U.S. Census Public Use Microdata Samples 
1950,60,70,80,90. We used real weekly wages (1990 constant U.S.$)  for white males 40-50 
years of age. 
 
 
Table 2 shows also that the increase in skill premium is a much more dramatic phenomenon 
over the 1950-1990 interval if we consider the ”College-HS Dropouts” premium, rather then the 
“College-High School” premium. The second premium almost doubled over those forty years while 
the first increased by less than 50%. Also, while the “College-High School” premium did not 
increase during the seventies (this is known in the literature), the “College-HS Dropouts” premium 
increased in each decade. The table also reports the behavior of the average real wage, relative to its 
1950 level.  Notice that while the period 1950-1970 combined large growth of the skill-premium 
and large growth of the average wage, the following period 1970-90 experienced growth in skill 
premium (especially the 80’s) but was much smaller growth rates of real wages.  
As mentioned above we choose two ways of constructing the two skill groups. The main 
difference between them is how we calculate the average wage of each group, while the relative 
supply is calculated in a similar fashion. On one hand, both methods use High School Dropouts and 
their average wage (for white, males, 40-50 years) to measure L and w
L. On the other hand the first 
method considers college graduates as the “base group” in the High skilled group, while the second 
method considers High School Graduates as “base group” among the high skills. The first (and 
preferred) method converts the supply of high school graduates and college dropouts in College-
equivalents (using relative wages) and considers the average wage of college graduates as w
H
. The 
second method, aimed at maximizing the comparability with Caselli and Coleman (2002a), 
considers high school graduates as the base group for the high skill group. This method converts the 
supply of college dropouts and college graduates into high school equivalents using relative wages   14
and uses the average wage of all people with high school or more education to calculate w
H
. The 
two methods are rather similar and yield similar results. lct and hct  , the relative supply of high and 
low skills, are calculated relative to the total labor force across states and census years.  
 
 
4.2 Description and Quality of the Instruments 
It is hard to find credible instruments for the supply of skills in a state. Acemoglu and 
Angrist (2000) used data on state and year specific legal restriction to the minimum years of 
schooling in order to instrument for individual schooling attainments. We aggregate these 
instruments for individuals by state of residence in order to obtain instruments for state level of 
skills. The maximum age for school enrollment, the minimum dropout age, the minimum schooling 
required and the minimum age for a working permit are combined to calculate the minimum 
number of years of schooling mandated by the law in each state and year (1914-1963). It is 
convenient to summarize these laws in two sets of variables, one capturing the effect of compulsory 
attendance (CA) laws and the other capturing the effect of child labor (CL) laws. It turns out that 
the child labor laws prescribed a minimum number of years of schooling between 6 and 9 across 
states and years, while the compulsory attendance laws imposed a minimum between 8 and 11 
years. In order to summarize the effects of these laws we associate to each individual eight 
dummies, CL6-CL9 and CA8-CA11 that capture the minimum years of schooling prescribed by the 
laws in the state in which she was resident, at the time she was 14.  For instance the dummy CL7 is 
equal to one if the state of residence of the person, at the time she was 14, had child labor laws 
imposing a minimum of 7 years of schooling and it is 0 otherwise. Similarly the variable, say, CA9 
is equal to 1 for a person whose state of residence when she was 14 had compulsory attendance 
laws imposing a minimum of 9 years of schooling and it is 0 otherwise. The dummy CL6 is one for 
6 years or less of compulsory schooling and CL9 is one for 9 years or more of compulsory 
schooling prescribed by Child Labor Laws. Similarly CA8 is one for 8 year or less and CA11 is one 
for 11 years or more of schooling prescribed by compulsory attendance laws. In the individual 
PUMS sample each person has only one of the CL6-CL9 dummies being equal to one and similarly 
for the CA8-CA11 dummies, while all other are 0.  Aggregating individuals by state of residence 
we calculate the share of workers for which each of the CL6-CL9 and CA8-CA11 dummies are 
equal to one and we use those eight averages by state and census year as instruments. We assume 
that the state of current residence is also the state where people were residing at 14. This implies 
that the correlation of instruments and skill supply comes from the group of people who were 
affected by the laws and did not change state. Such choice minimizes the problem of endogeneity of   15
the location decision. The identifying assumption needed in order to use these variables as 
instruments for the relative supply of skills across U.S. states is that the change in laws affected the 
change of skill supply in a state across years but they were not affected by the adopted technology 
in a state over those years. Given that the time for implementing compulsory attendance and child 
labor laws across states was dictated by cultural and ideological reasons more than by productivity 
considerations this seems plausible.  Moreover Acemoglu and Angrist (2000) show that these laws 
affected significantly the graduation rate from high school but not the educational attainments after 
high school of people in those states. Therefore they do not seem associated to other changes in 
educational structure that changed (unobserved) quality of education. 
These dummies (6 in total, excluding one per group) have some explanatory power on the 
supply of the skilled and unskilled. We report in Table 3 the first stage regressions and some 
indicators of the power of the instruments on the measures of the relative skill supply calculated in 
several different ways. The explanatory power of the instruments is expressed as the F-test of the 
exclusion of the instruments from the first stage regression. This statistic captures the joint 
significance of instruments at the first stage. We also report the partial R
2 measuring the variance of 
the independent variable orthogonal to all other exogenous control explained by the instruments. 
The first stage regressions include state dummies and a time trend as exogenous variables so that 
the identifying variation is given by within state across years change in the instruments.  
Across the columns of Table 3 we use different measures of Hct to construct ln(Hct/Lct). 
Column 1-2  (and 5-6) use HS Dropouts and College graduates as base-group for L and H. In 
specification 1 and 5 we simply use relative supply of these two groups, while in specification 2 and 
6 we attribute all the workers with at least a high school degree to the group H, using relative wages 
as weights. Specification 3-4 (and 7-8) consider HS Dropouts and HS graduates as base-groups for 
L and H. In Specification 3 (and 7) we simply consider the relative supply of HS graduates and HS 
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Table 3:  
First Stage Regressions 
  CA and CL  CA and CL plus Share under 15 










































































































2  0.051  0.056 0.058 0.056 0.51  0.52  0.50  0.60 





















Dependent Variable: ln(Hct/Lct) . All first stage regressions include state fixed effects and Time trend. Standard errors in 
parenthesis. 
Specification 1 and 5: ln(Hct/Lct) calculated using Hct=number of college graduate only, Lct=number of HS dropouts.  
Specification 2 and 6: ln(Hct/Lct) calculated using Hct=number of college graduate plus college-equivalents of HS 
graduates and College dropouts, Lct=number of HS dropouts.  
Specification 3 and 7: ln(Hct/Lct) calculated using Hct=number of High School Graduates only, Lct=number of HS 
dropouts.  
Specification 4 and 8: ln(Hct/Lct) calculated using  Hct=number of High School Graduates plus HS-equivalents of College 
dropouts and College Graduates, Lct=number of HS dropouts.  
The test of over-identifying restrictions used is the version of the Hausman Test corrected for Heteroskedasticity as 
described in Woolridge (2001) pag 123. 
*=reject the exclusion restriction at 10% 
**=reject the exclusion restriction at 5% 
***=reject the exclusion restriction at 1% 
a= the 95% critical value of the statistic is in parenthesis. 
 
 
The significance of each of the CA and CL variables, singularly taken, is rarely high and, as 
expected, they always enter positively in explaining the relative supply of skills. The inclusion of 
CA and CL variables together, however, is never rejected at the 10% significance level. The 
variance of the dependent variable explained by the CA-CL instruments only is not too large 
(between 3 and 6%) so our instruments are somewhat weak. To cope with this problem we take two 
steps. First, when using CA and CL only as instruments we adopt, besides 2SLS, other estimation 
procedures which have been proven to be more robust to weak instrument bias in small samples. 
The methods of estimations that we use are Limited Information Maximum Likelihood (LIML)   17
recommended by  Chao and Swanson (2002) in the case of many weak instruments and the Fuller-
modified LIML recommended by Stock, Wright and Yogo (2002) and by Hahn and Hausman 
(2002). Second, in order to increase the explanatory power of the instruments we introduce a 
variable that captures the demographic structure of the states and is probably important to determine 
the differential impact of state laws on skill supply. This variable is the share of population whose 
age is below 15 in each of census years.  As schooling laws have produced progressively better 
educated younger generations, states with a larger fraction of young population at the beginning of 
each decade experienced larger increases in skill supply. While the variables based on CA-CL laws 
capture the presence of an institutional change in the state, the share of people below 15 captures 
the part of the population on which this change may have an important impact.  
Column 5 to 8 of Table 3 shows that such instrument is highly correlated with the dependent 
variable and the F-test of exclusion is now consistently larger than 7 and, in the case of skill supply 
obtained using all education groups, the F-test of exclusion is above 13. Arguably the demographic 
variable is less exogenous than child labor laws as the fertility choices of people could depend 
endogenously on productivity or technological change
8.  However, trusting the exogeneity of child 
labor laws we perform a Hausman test on the over-identifying restrictions in the 2SLS specification 
(last column of the table) when we include all the CA-CL and the share of people below 15. The 
test does not reject the null hypothesis that none of the instruments (including the share of people 
below 15 in the state) enter the second stage equation. The restrictions are tested allowing for 
heteroskedasticity of the residuals. We use the version of the test in Woolridge (2001) page 123. 
The null hypothesis is never rejected at standard significance levels (5%). All in all we believe that 
the CA-CL laws, complemented by the demographic variable, provide credible, exogenous and 
robust, instruments for the supply of skills. We use the whole set in estimating the elasticity of 





5. Estimates  
 





                                                            
8 This has been argued recently, for instance, by Doepke and Zilibotti (2003)   18
Table 4 
Estimates of (1-σ) from equation (9) 
  Base-Groups: HS Dropouts 
and College Graduates 
Base-Groups: HS Dropouts 
and HS graduates 
Specification  I II  III  IV 
Description  Supply:    
2 groups only 
Supply: 
All Groups  
Supply: 
2 Groups only 
Supply: 
All Groups  


















IV with state dummies and time 











LIML  with state dummies and 
time trend (using state of residence 









Fuller-modified LIML, α=1,  
with state dummies and time trend 










Fuller-modified LIML, α=4,  
with state dummies and time trend 










IV with state dummies and time 
trend (using CA-CL and share 









LIML  with state dummies and time 
trend (using state of residence CA 









Fuller-modified LIML, α=1,  with 
state dummies and time trend (using 
state of residence CA and CL and 









Fuller-modified LIML, α=4,  with 
state dummies and time trend (using 
state of residence CA and CL and 









Years: 1950-1990, 48 U.S. continental states, Tot. Observations 240 
Heteroskedasticity Robust Standard Errors in Parenthesis 
*= significant at 10% 
**=significant at 5% 
***=significant at 1% 
a Lc=HS Dropouts, Hc=Co+0.28*HS+ 0.50*Co_dropouts (weights from relative wages) 
b Lc= HS. Dropouts, Hc=HS +1.78CO Dropouts + 3.57 CO (weight from relative wages) 
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Our key estimation results are shown in Table 4. We report the estimates of the parameter 
(1-σ) from a regression like (9) in which we include state fixed effects, to account for different 
initial levels of the skill-biased technology across states and a common time trend that captures the 
average national skill biased progress. We adopt several estimation techniques using CA8-CA10 
(referred to simply as CA) and CL7-CL9 (referred to simply as CL) as instruments for the 
variable ( ) ct ct H L / ln  in rows 3-6 of Table 4. In some specifications (rows 7 to 10) we also include the 
share of population under 15 as instrument. In order to see the effect of the instrumental variable 
estimation on the coefficient estimates we first present (first row) the estimates of regression (9) 
using OLS, without any control and then (second row) with state and time dummies as controls. 
Our preferred specification, throughout the table, is the one in Column II in which we use HS 
Dropouts and College Graduates as base groups for the low-skills (L) and high skills (H) 




ct w w / ln  are those of 
white males 40 to 50 years old, with no degree (w
L
ct) or with a college degree (w
H
ct). Column I, 
only differs because we use the HS Dropouts and College Graduate groups to construct the relative 
supply of skills without accounting for the rest of the workers. Column III and IV are the same as I 
and II but HS graduates (rather than College Graduates) and their wages are chosen as “base group” 
for high skilled. Low skilled workers are still represented by HS Dropouts. 
Considering the OLS estimates without controls (first row) we find a positive (!) correlation 
between relative skill supply and relative returns of skills (i.e. the negative sign on the 1-σ 
coefficient). Such positive correlation was noted before in the literature that considered the behavior 
of the aggregate U.S. economy over time (Katz and Murphy 1992). This means that the endogeneity 
of skill supply and/or the skill-driven technological progress generates a strong positive correlation 
between Λct and the supply of high-skilled workers across states: a higher share of highly skilled 
workers is associated with and higher skill-premium (rather than a lower) for the workers in that 
state. However, allowing for different initial technologies across states (state-effects) and for a 
common time trend in the skill-biased progress we obtain in the second row a negative correlation 
between skill supply and their returns. If the state-specific changes of skills were exogenous this 
row would provide a correct estimate of the elasticity of substitutions between skills. The value of 
such elasticity would be between 2.5 and 3.4 with a preferred estimate of 2.8. Such value for the 
elasticity is quite large and it certainly suffers from the possible bias due to endogeneity of skill 
supply across states.  
In rows 3 through 6 we consider the CL and CA laws as instruments and we use several 
different estimation techniques. The third row shows the results from a 2SLS estimation with robust 
standard errors, the fourth row shows the results from a LIML estimation and row five and six show   20
estimates from the Fuller-modified LIML estimation, that corrects for the small sample bias of the 
LIML estimator .  The parameter α, is a positive number to be inputed in the calculation of the 
Fuller (1977)- modified LIML. A value of α =1 as in row five delivers a “nearly unbiased” 
estimator, while a value of  α =4 as in row six produces the estimator with the lowest mean square 
error. The estimates for (1-σ) in all specifications using CA and CL as instruments are significantly 
larger than in the case of OLS estimates. This confirms the presence of a downward OLS bias due 
to endogeneity of technological progress. The estimates of (1-σ) vary between 0.51 and 0.83 with a 
mean and median estimate around 0.65.  The standard errors of the estimates are not small. They 
range from 0.21 to 0.35 and this is clearly the result of the weakness of the instruments. 
Specifications in rows 7-10 include also the share of people below 15 as instrument, in order to 
increase the precision of the estimates. Again we use the four different methods (2SLS, LIML, 
Fuller LIML with α=1 or 4) and the four different specifications. Now the estimates of (1-σ) are 
somewhat lower ranging between 0.42 and 0.64 (the average is around 0.5) and their standard errors 
are reduced to close to 0.10.  Balancing between the higher precision of the second set of estimates 
and the higher reliability of the instruments of the first set we consider the range 0.51-0.64 as the 
most appropriate. In this range the two sets of estimates overlap and also the preferred specification 
of Column II has average estimate around 0.65. Considering the preferred range of  our estimates 
the elasticity of substitution between skills is within the interval [1.55 (=1/0.64),  1.97 (=1/0.51)]. 
Considering  the whole range of estimates and their standard errors, however, the elasticity of 
substitution could be as large as 2.2 and as small as 1.25. We discuss these estimates in the next 
section. However, we perform the analysis of skill biased and Hicks neutral technological level 
using (1-σ)=0.64 and (1-σ)=0.51 as our focal estimates. As the first value (1-σ)=0.64 is actually 




5.2 Stability of the elasticity over time 
Equation (9) and the subsequent empirical procedure assume that the parameter σ is constant 
over time, while skill-biased technological level changes. While this is an assumption shared by 
large part of this literature we verify here that it is not contradicted by the data. Our model is 
meaningful only if we can explain relative change in wages as effect of changing skill-biased 
technological progress for given elasticity of substitution between skills. If also the elasticity 
parameter changed significantly over decades then identification become more dubious. An easy   21
way to check this assumption is to test that the data do not reject constant elasticity over time. We 
do this by estimating (9) while allowing for different elasticity in the early period (1950-70) and in 
the more recent one (1970-90). We cannot estimate different elasticity each single decade as we 
want to control for state fixed effects. We perform such estimation on the preferred specification 
(Column II of Table 4) using 2SLS with CA-CL and the 2SLS with CA-CL and share under 15 (i.e. 
specification in row 3 and 7) allowing the elasticity to be different in the two periods.  We obtain 
that estimates of (1-σ) are equal to 0.63 (s.e. 0.12) before 1970 and 0.66 (s.e 0.16) post 1970 using 
CA-CL as IV, and they are 0.56 (s.e. 0.11 ) pre-1970 and 0.46 (s.e. 0.11) post 1970. A formal test of 
equality between the two coefficients does not reject the null of equal values in either case at the 
10% confidence level.  Similar results are obtained with other specifications, so that we are 
reassured that the estimated elasticity is not only appropriate for the recent decades but the data do 




Estimates of σ in our work and in the literature 
Authors, Method and Sample  Preferred 
estimate of (1-σ) 
Std Error 
Ciccone and Peri 
IV on panel of U.S. States 
0.64 0.12 
Fallon and Layard (1975) 
Cross-country 
0.67 0.07 
Katz and Murphy (1992) 
OLS on U.S. time series 
0.71 0.15 
Murphy et al. (1998) 





Krusell et al. (2000) 
U.S. time series 
0.60 0.23 






5.3 Comparison with Previous Estimates 
There are several estimates of the aggregate elasticity of substitution between more skilled 
and less skilled workers. Some times these estimates are framed in a nested CES production 
function in which capital is allowed to be a closer complement of skilled than unskilled labor, other   22
times, as in our case, capital is assumed to be combined with skilled and unskilled labor in a “Cobb-
Douglas” composite or it is ignored altogether. We review some of those estimates here.  We will 
conclude that neither the above-mentioned differences in specification nor our methodological 
issues generate big differences in the estimates of elasticity of substitution. We consider only few 
other influential studies that provide a benchmark.  Table 5 summarizes some of the existing 
estimates of the parameter (1- σ) derived from aggregate production functions. Fallon and Layard 
(1975) analyzed skill and capital complementarity. They estimated (1- σ) at 0.67 using 22 countries 
and a nested CES including capital as complement to high skills. They used a simultaneous 
equation approach, recognizing the problem of skill endogeneity across countries, but they used a 
rather poor instrument for the supply of skills, namely a measure of income per capita which is 
clearly correlated with technological level. More recently Katz and Murphy (1992) estimated an 
equation identical to (6) using the U.S. aggregate yearly time series. They used 25 observations 
(1963-1987) and assumed a constant and positive skill-biased technological growth during each 
year. They obtained a short-run estimate of (1- σ ) based on yearly variation equal to 0.71. As 
mentioned, however, they did not address the issue of endogenous skill supply. Murphy et al (1998) 
applied the same method and procedure to data from Canada 1981-1995 and obtained an estimate of 
(1- σ )  equal to 0.73 with a standard error of 0.13. Johnson (1997) followed the same approach as 
Katz and Murphy and adopted an estimate of (1- σ )  for his simulations equal to 0.66. Finally two 
recent works that adopted the nested CES approach, estimated 1- σ to be equal to 0.60 (Krusell et al 
2000) and to 0.76 (Caselli and Coleman 2002a) using U.S. time series data and international cross 
sectional data respectively.   
Our preferred estimate of the inverse of the elasticity of substitution between high and low 
skills, (1- σ )=0.64 is, therefore, in the same ballpark as the existing estimates.  It is on the low part 
of the range (only one estimate is smaller) and about as precise as any other (only two have smaller 
standard errors). Compared to two existing estimates that use time-series data for the aggregate US 
(Katz and Murphy 1992 and Krusell at al. 2000) our estimate is right in between. We could argue 
that our elasticity estimate (1.55) is larger than Katz and Murphy (1992) because we use a longer 
interval of time (ten years) allowing better substitutability between the two factors. On the other 
hand our elasticity estimate is somewhat smaller than Krusell et al. (2000) but considering our 
preferred range for (1- σ) that is (0.51-0.64), their estimate is contain within it.  
Our approach uses a different method, credible IV and high quality data and we regard it as 
an improvement on the methods used so far. The precision of the estimates, the exogeneity of the 
instruments, the ability to control for state and time effects, the homogeneity of data sources and of   23
institutional and legal arrangements across states make us confident that we have a good point 
estimate of the elasticity of substitution between high and low skilled workers.  The reassuring fact, 
in terms of the practice commonly adopted by the aggregate literature, is that the prevalent estimate 
of 1.5 as elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled, is also very close to what we find.  
 
6. Technological Progress 
6.1 Skill-Biased Technological Progress 
Using our estimates of the parameter σ, namely 0.36 and 0.49 (the extremes of the preferred 
range), we calculate and describe in this section the general features of skill-biased technology and 
its growth across U.S. states. The average SBTP across states in each decade and the average SBTP 
for each state (1950-90) are reported in Tables A1, A2 and A3 of the appendix.  In the appendix we 
report the values obtained using each of the two estimates of σ, however given that in most cases 
the qualitative results are rather similar we analyze and comment in this section prevalently the 
results from σ=0.36. First of all, SBTP is not a phenomenon that begins in the eighties. The whole 
period 1950-1990 experienced a continuous and stunning growth of skill biased technological level. 
Our estimates imply an average yearly SBTP of 4.8% during the 50’s, 5.8% during the sixties, 5.1% 
during the seventies and 7.0% during the eighties. Certainly, during the eighties the phenomenon 
had a significant acceleration but this component of technological level has been growing 
dramatically since the 50’s. While these numbers may seem very large the reader should keep in 
mind that such enormous SBTP is needed to ensure a doubling of the skill-unskilled premium 
during the 1950-1990 (See Table 2)  vis-à-vis an eleven-fold increase in the relative supply of 
skilled (High School graduates and higher degrees) versus unskilled (High School Dropouts).  Over 
the whole period SBTP was about 5.7% per year with some differences across decades. This 
estimate is quite larger than what assumed in Katz and Murphy (1992) in which a constant trend 
growth for SBTP is used in equation (10) with a value of 3.3% per year. Our definition of skills, 
though, differs from theirs as we use High School dropouts as low skills rather than High School 
Graduates.  
Considering relative skill biased Technological levels across states one fact is worth 
noticing. Figure 1 and 2 show the distribution (re-centered in 0) of relative Skill-biased 
technological levels (i.e. ln(Λct)) in 1950 and 1990. Figure 1 shows SBTL obtained when σ=0.36 
while Figure 2 assumes σ=0.49. What is clear is that overall there has been an increase in the 
dispersion of skill-biased technological levels across states. States with higher initial skill biased 
technology had an overall tendency (in the 1950-90) to increase their advantage even further. 
Looking at Table A2 (or A3) to identify some of the fast- SBTP states we notice that several   24
western states are in the top positions. Arizona and New Mexico, for instance, experienced average 
SBTP of 7-8% for the whole period 1950-90. To the other end of the range more “rural states” such 
as the Dakotas and Rhode Island had SBTP below 4.5%  per year.  
 
Figure 1 
























 SBTL 1950, sigma=0.36  SBTL 1990, sigma=0.36






























 SBTL 1950, sigma=0.49  SBTL 1990, sigma=0.49
-.9 -.45 0 .45 .9
.056766
1.76833
   25
 
6.2 Hicks Neutral Technological Progress 
  With the estimates of σ  and  Λct  at hands, we can use equation (8) to derive HNTP.  
Besides Λct , hct, lct, and σ,  we also need measures of the real wage, of the real interest rate rt and of 
depreciation rate δ  and, most importantly, of the share of capital in total production, αc. Real wage 
wct  is measured as average real weekly wage of male white workers between 22 and 59 years of 
age. This procedure minimizes any impact from racial and gender composition effect and corrects 
for differences in weeks worked. As measure of real interest rate rt  in each census year we use the 
average real rate relative to the five previous years (e.g. 45-50 for 1950, 55-60 for 1960 and so on). 
The real interest rate is calculated as the annual rate on the three months T-bill net of “ex-post” 
inflation. As depreciation rate we use the most commonly used δ=10%. Using this procedure we 
obtain the following values for Rt=(rt+δ): 7% in 1950, 11% in 1960, 11% in 1970, 8.1% in 1980 
and 12.5% in 1990.  In order to calculate the share of capital for each state, αc we use the state 
income accounts. We take the total gross state product net of indirect taxes as measure of total 
income. As measure of share of income to the labor factor we adopt the accurate procedure 
proposed by Gollin (2002). First we impute as labor income all the wage and salary income of 
employees. Then we calculate the average labor income of employees and we impute to self-
employed the same average labor income. The sum of measured labor income of employees and 
imputed labor income of self-employed is used as measure of total labor income. Dividing this by 
total income gives us an estimate of (1-αc). The data for these variables are available from the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income and Production Accounts 
(http://www.bea.gov/bea/regional/spi/). At the state level they can be found for the period 1975-
2000. We calculate αct for each state over this period. We checked that there is no relevant time 
variation of such share in each state over the period, by testing that no state has any significantly 
positive or negative time trend in their labor share. This is true for 45 out of 48 states. We use the 
average share 1975-2000 for each state as measure of its (1-αc). While there are few outliers 
probably due to the composition of their productive sectors (Alaska and Wyoming with low labor 
shares and D.C. with high labor share) forty states have labor shares between 0.67 and 0.72. Using 
these data we calculate the first term of the accounting equation (8):  t c R ln ∆ α . While theoretically 
important these terms are almost identical across states because the rental rate of capital is common 
nationwide and the shares αc are almost identical across states. Most of the action in identifying 
different HNTP across states comes from the second term of equation (8),  ) ~ ln( ) 1 ( ct c w ∆ −α . We first   26
compute the “adjustment factor”  σ σ σ
1
) ( ct ct ct h l Λ +  , then we divide the average wage by this factor and 
compute the log change multiplying it by the share of income to labor. As σ is very important in 
calculating the adjustment factor using different estimates of the parameter may have a relevant 
effect on the estimates of HNTP. Adding the two terms we obtain an accounting measure of 
∆ln(Ωct). The average value of this term across states in each decade is reported in Table A1. The 
average growth rates (1950-90) by state are reported in Table A2 (using σ=0.36) and Table A3 
(using σ=0.49). Notice that the behavior of average HNTP is quite different over decades. While in 
the 50-70 period HNTP is positive or close to 0 (depending on the estimates) in the 70-90 period it 
is large and negative. Vis a vis a continued positive SBTP throughout the 1950-90 period, during 
the early decades HNTP averaged a moderate positive growth but the after 1970 it experienced 
relatively large negative change. This confirms the previous findings of Caselli and Coleman 
(2002b) who, by looking at the aggregate U.S. behavior, observed increasing efficiency of both 
skilled and unskilled labor in the sixties, while since the seventies they measured an increase in 
skilled labor efficiency together with a decrease in unskilled labor efficiency. Although, in their 
main specification Caselli and Coleman (2002b) include complementarity between physical capital 
and skilled workers their “simplified specification” (mentioned at page 150-151) without capital is 
totally analogous to ours. In such specification what they call unskilled labor efficiency (in logs) 
would be equal to (1-αc)ln(Ωct), while what they call skilled labor efficiency (in logs) would be 
equal to (1-αc)ln(Ωct)+ ln(Λct).  Calculating the growth rates of these terms over decades for the 
average of the states, we confirm an average growth of unskilled labor efficiency by 0.4% per year 
during the period  1950-70 while there was a negative growth of -2.5% a year in the 1970-90 
period. Skilled labor efficiency, to the contrary, increased during the whole 1950-1990 period at an 
average of 4.6% per year in the fifties and sixties and of 5.1% per year in the seventies and eighties. 
 
 
6.3 Technological Progress Frontier 
 Interestingly, the negative correlation between SBTP (high in the period 1950-70 and low in 
the period 1970-90) and HNTP (Lower in 1950-70 than in 1970-90) is not only an aggregate 
phenomenon concerning the whole U.S. If we consider the SBTP and HNTP in each decade for 
each state and we plot them, one against the other we see an interesting pattern. Figure 3 shows the 
plot for the fifties while Figure 4 reproduces the plot for the eighties. Each point is the combination 
of SBTP and HNTP for one of the 48 continental U.S. states during one decade. The visual 
impression, confirmed by the OLS coefficients estimated separately for each decade and reported in   27
Table 6, suggests that a clear and increasingly steep and tight trade off between SBTP and HNTP 
across states existed throughout the period and strengthened over time and much in the eighties. 
While a weaker and less precise relation between these two forms of technological progress is 
present during the early decade (Figure 3), in the 1980’s states willing to give up some Hicks 
neutral technological progress could benefit from higher skill biased technological progress in a 
tight almost one to one fashion (Figure 4). All states, over time, moved to a type of progress with 
lower and even negative Hicks neutral growth in the seventies and eighties and to higher skill 
biased progress. Moreover, those states that were willing to sacrifice more Hicks neutral growth 
could achieve higher skill biased growth. Interestingly, the technological opportunity frontier 
available to US States, became more and more efficient in producing skill-biased progress over the 
decades since 1950, as the estimates show. Using the estimates of Table 6 (σ=0.49) we can 
calculate that in the fifties, by giving up one standard deviation of HNTP a state gained 60% of a 
standard deviation in SBTP equal to roughly 1.2% extra growth in skill-biased Technological 
progress per year. In the eighties a decrease of one standard deviation in HNTP would have granted 




Trade-Off between SBTP and HNTP  across US states in the fifties (σ=0.36)  
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Figure 4 
Trade-Off Between SBTP and HNTP across US states in the eighties (σ=0.36) 
 






























Trade-off between SBTP and HNTP across US states in different Decades 
Dependent variable: ∆ln(Λct) 
 
 
The dependent and independent variables have been standardized by their std. deviation 
so coefficients are comparable across regressions 
***= significant at 1% level 
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7. Discussion and Conclusions 
 
Our findings suggest that the technologies introduced during the considered period, and 
particularly those introduced during the eighties presented U.S. states with a menu of options. The 
representative firm in a state could adopt a technological path with a faster skill-biased 
technological change relative to another state. However, such choice implied a “cost” in terms of 
Hicks neutral technological change to be traded off against the gain of skill-biased progress. We 
may think of the technological menu as a more or less intense undertaking of a new technology. For 
the eighties, in which this phenomenon is most prominent, we can actually think of a new general 
purpose technology (GPT) being introduced that corresponds to what is generally defined as 
information and communication technology (ICT). This technology generated productivity gains 
concentrated among the skilled workers but required relevant restructuring of the productive tasks 
that probably disrupted the productivity of less skilled workers. Previous technologies (since the 
fifties) seem to have worked in a similar way but ICT made the trade off more drastic. Several 
studies have stressed that the adoption of new technology may generate a period of decrease in 
productivity, when the technology is new as the restructuring decreases efficiency. Helpman and 
Trajtenberg (1998) characterize the initial phase of a new technology as “a time to sow” while only 
when the supply of factors complementary to the new technology has increased there are benefit in 
productivity to “be reaped”. Atkeson and Kehoe (2001) emphasize how it takes some time before a 
new vintage of technologies is incorporated into the production process and this causes a delay 
between technology diffusion and the effects on productivity. Our findings, however, emphasize 
how the gains of the adoption of the new technology are not uniformly distributed across skills. The 
adoption of more intensely skill-biased technology caused U.S. states to give up Hicks neutral 
progress often to the extent that the net effect was negative growth of efficiency of the unskilled. 
This paper is able to measure these important characteristics of technological progress in the 
United States by looking at differences across states during the period 1950-1990. As the U.S. states 
are at the frontier of technology, measuring and characterizing their technological progress provide 
important insights into the process of generating and adopting new technologies. This is made 
possible as we produce a methodologically sound and precise estimate of the elasticity of 
substitution between skilled and unskilled. We do this by using comparable and precise Census data 
across U.S. states, a long time period and instruments that are more exogenous than those typically 
used in cross country studies. As a result we obtain a set of elasticity estimates most of them in the 
range between 1.55 and 1.96.    30
The interesting fact emerging from our analysis of SBTP and HNTP is that across U.S. 
States the actual choice of technological path was quite different. In particular we are the first to 
document the existence of a technological trade-off for U.S. States between options that are more or 
less intensive in skill-biased technological progress. Different states were on different paths which 
corresponded to different combinations of Hicks-neutral and skill-biased technological progress.  
Our main results confirm and strengthen the finding of Caselli and Colemann (2002a, b), who first 
identified such trade-off.  
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A. Data Appendix 
 
The paper uses data from the 1950, 60, 70, 80 and 90 IPUMS files in order to calculate the 
relative supply of skills and relative wages. The extract is exactly the same used in the work by 
Acemoglu and Angrist (2000) and kindly provided to us by the authors.  The extract includes US-
born individuals white men aged 21-59. We exclude the non-continental states (Alaska and Hawaii) 
and D.C. The observations are weighted by the IPUMS weighting variable (SLWT). The schooling 
of individuals was divided into the four base-groups (HS dropouts, HS, College Dropouts and 
College Graduates)  using the variable HIGRADED for the 1950-80 data and the variable 
YEARSCH for the 1990 census.  The variable used to calculate wages is weekly wage obtained by 
dividing yearly wage (wage and salary income) by the number of weeks worked. Wages are top-
coded uniformly across census years. The censoring is at the 98
th percentile using the 98
th percentile 
times 1.5. 
The data on child labor laws and compulsory attendance laws are described in the Appendix 
of Acemoglu and Angrist 2000. Data on income are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. The 
data on real wages are calculated using nominal weekly wages from the IPUMS data and deflating 
them by using the GDP deflator from the BEA. These data are more precise than estimates obtained 
from aggregate wage data as, previous to 1969, the data on employed are rather imprecise.   
Table A1 and A2 report the estimates of ln(Λct), the skill-biased technological level and its 
average yearly growth rate for the following decade. Table 1 reports the values averaging across 
different states for each decade, Table A2 reports the values of averaging across decades for each 
state. Table A3 and A4 report the estimates of ln(Ωct), the Hicks-Neutral technological level and its 
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Table A1 

















































Value of σ used  σ=0.36  σ=0.49 
1950’s +0.8%  +4.8%  +1.3  +4.3% 
1960’s -1.0%  +5.8%  -0.1%  +4.9% 
1970’s -4.8%  +5.1%  -3.4%  +4.1 
1980’s -3.5%  +7.0%  -1.5%  +6.1 
State HNTP  SBTP  State  HNTP  SBTP 
Arizona -0.036  0.082  Kentucky  -0.013  0.057 
New Mexico  -0.037  0.069  Michigan  -0.018  0.057 
Maine -0.022  0.067  Tennessee  -0.017  0.057 
Arkansas -0.020  0.066  Texas  -0.027  0.057 
Colorado -0.025  0.066  Massachusetts  -0.023  0.056 
New Hampshire  -0.021  0.064  Nebraska  -0.025  0.056 
Montana -0.028  0.063  Alabama  -0.020  0.056 
North Carolina  -0.021  0.063  Virginia  -0.021  0.055 
Pennsylvania -0.025  0.063  Georgia -0.020  0.054 
California -0.029  0.063  Ohio -0.019  0.053 
New Jersey  -0.027  0.063  Missouri  -0.019  0.053 
Florida -0.027  0.063  Wisconsin  -0.021  0.053 
Wyoming -0.033  0.062  Iowa -0.024  0.052 
Connecticut -0.029  0.062  Vermont  -0.016  0.051 
Idaho -0.026  0.062  Louisiana  -0.027  0.050 
Utah -0.027  0.061  Delaware  -0.029  0.049 
West Virginia  -0.015  0.061  Kansas  -0.023  0.049 
New York  -0.030  0.060  Mississippi  -0.017  0.048 
Minnesota -0.023  0.060  Nevada  -0.020  0.047 
Illinois -0.026  0.059  Indiana  -0.015  0.046 
Oregon -0.025  0.059  Oklahoma  -0.018  0.046 
Maryland -0.022  0.059  Rhode  Island  -0.016  0.044 
South Carolina  -0.018  0.058  North Dakota  -0.013  0.043 







Average (yearly) HNTP and SBTP by state over the period 1950-1990 (σ=0.49) 
 
name HNTP  SBTP  name  HNTP  SBTP 
Arizona -0.020  0.074  Kentucky  -0.005  0.049 
New Mexico  -0.020  0.061  Washington  -0.013  0.049 
Maine -0.011  0.059  Michigan  -0.008  0.049 
Arkansas -0.009  0.058  Texas  -0.013  0.049 
Colorado -0.013  0.057  Massachusetts  -0.011  0.048 
New Hampshire  -0.009  0.055  Alabama  -0.009  0.048 
Florida -0.014  0.055  Virginia  -0.010  0.047 
Montana -0.015  0.055  Nebraska  -0.011  0.046 
Pennsylvania -0.013  0.055  Ohio  -0.009  0.045 
California -0.015  0.055  Georgia  -0.009  0.045 
North Carolina  -0.009  0.054  Missouri  -0.009  0.044 
Wyoming -0.015  0.054  Iowa  -0.011  0.043 
West Virginia  -0.007  0.054  Wisconsin  -0.010  0.043 
Idaho -0.014  0.054  Vermont  -0.007  0.043 
Utah -0.014  0.054  Louisiana  -0.012  0.042 
New Jersey  -0.013  0.053  Delaware  -0.015  0.041 
Connecticut -0.015  0.053  Kansas  -0.011  0.040 
New York  -0.015  0.051  Mississippi  -0.006  0.040 
Illinois -0.013  0.051  Nevada  -0.009  0.040 
Oregon -0.013  0.050  Indiana -0.006  0.039 
Maryland -0.010  0.050  Oklahoma  -0.008  0.038 
South Carolina  -0.008  0.050  Rhode Island  -0.006  0.036 
Tennessee -0.007  0.050  North  Dakota  -0.002  0.033 
Minnesota -0.010  0.049  South  Dakota  -0.005  0.028 
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